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This article tracks historically the direct connection and shifting relationship between the larger political economy, the extent and arrangementof
financing, and agency programming in the settlement house from 1886
to the present, with particular attention to agency experience in New
York City. During this time the settlements changed from being informal
organizationsoriented to service provision and community building, in
which funding was a highly private matter, to formalized, multiservice
agencies dependent on contracted public funds for categorical programs.
This transformationresulted not as a linearprogressionof organizational
development but ratheras an historical process tied to shifting patternsof
political economy and voluntary sector financing.

This article tracks historically the direct connection and shifting relationship between financing and nonprofit social service
provision. While this critical linkage has been explored historically for other nonprofit institutions, such as schools and hospitals, it is relatively absent for social service agencies (Hammack,
1996; Hall, 1992). The prism of our exploration, the settlement
house, is the quintessential voluntary service agency that has historically struggled to balance service and social action, function
and cause. Critically, this exploration of the history of financing
social settlements discovered a direct and dynamic relationship
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between political economy, agency funding, and settlement programming. Within this meta-statement the study proposes a cyclical theory and periodicity regarding settlement programming,
financing, and political economy. Moreover, this historical analysis explores the impact of contemporary contracted financing
on the capacity of neighborhood-based social agencies to deliver
community-based services and engage in the historically and
presently critical work of community building.
Historical Change and Political Economy
in the Financing of Settlement Houses
Settlements have been a favorite subject of social welfare historians dating back to the 1960s, when Chambers (1963) and Davis
(1967) published monographs enthusiastic about the progressive
work of settlement houses and their leaders. Since then historians
and social work academicians interested in social welfare history
have written widely on the settlement house, each with a different
lens, asking different questions, looking at different settlements,
and often arriving at different conclusions (To sample the divergent literature see Berry, 1986; Crocker, 1992; Karger, 1987;
Lasch-Quinn, 1993; Philpott, 1978; Sklar, 1995; Trolander, 1987).
Given the prominent place and role of nonprofit service agencies
throughout American history, this attention should be expected
(Hammack, 1998). What surprises in the settlement literature,
however, is a near complete ignoring of financing issues and funding patterns. Little mention is made of the process and extent of
settlement funding, and even less to the relation between funding
and settlement programming and politics. Part of the reason is
that settlements did not keep or leave very good financial records.
Funding was a private matter. Until government financing became the norm, settlements were highly informal organizations
with scant financial and administrative record keeping.
One way to evaluate settlement history in general and financing patterns in particular is to use a widely adopted social reform
model of social welfare history. This model sees social investment
as tied to changes in larger contexts. In a nutshell, it proposes
that the dominant political economy and historical events of each
era help shape and profoundly influence social provision and
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social change. In more liberal or public eras, the model asserts,
activism on the Left increases, the social welfare state expands,
as does the importance of social welfare and social investment
for reform-oriented service programming such as social settlements. In more conservative or private eras, conservative policy
and Right wing movements dominate, corporate prerogatives are
asserted with greater openness and diminished challenge, social
welfare systems become increasingly privatized and timid, which
reduces both interest in and funding for organizations such as the
settlement house.1
This study of the financing of social settlements approximates
and refines the social investment model. In general, settlement
ideals, programs, and progressive practice find more support
in social change eras; more quiescent private contexts occasion
antagonism to activist practice and settlement house ideals. Social investment eras such as the Progressive Era and the Sixties
resulted in support for settlement house core values, goals, and
financing. Even during the Great Depression, despite funding
instability, settlements revived in response to the heightened atmosphere of public life and social change. In more private eras,
such as the 1920s, 1950s, and since 1975, financial support declined for settlement practices of community building and social
action, narrowing to focus instead on recreational and categorical
programming and more individualized interventions.
But the history of financing settlement houses demonstrates
greater complexity than the cyclical model of recurrent expansion
and contraction driven by the larger political economy. For example, in private eras reductions occur in some, not all, programs,
and within historical epochs a dynamic, not static, relation persists between agency, funding, and programming. Additionally,
using a model of political economy enters a critical debate about
social change in urban life in general and social service organizations in particular. We find the structuralist/political economic
perspective most salient to our work (eg Fabricant and Burghardt,
1992; Fisher and Kling, 1993; Sassen, 1992) but recognize alternative theses regarding the impact of local political process and
culture (eg. Logan and Swanstrom, 1992; Putnam, 2000; LaschQuinn, 1993) as well as those emphasizing more postmodern
interpretations of human agency and values (eg. Smith, 1992;
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Featherstone and Lash, 1999). Of course the local political culture
of New York City, the secularization of service work, the professionalization of social work, organization development issues,
and the contributions countless people made on a daily basis also
deeply affected the nature, programs, and funding of social settlements. By emphasizing a structuralist model of political economy
this study seeks to expand, not narrow, this important debate in
political and social theory by putting these developments in a
larger contextual framework.
Moreover, while funding levels continually change, over time
settlement financing and administration reveal strong continuities as well as the ebb and flow emphasis of our thesis. Over
time settlement houses became increasingly centralized, publicly
financed, bureaucratic, and reliant on formal structures. Over
time their services were more likely to be defined by categorical
programming initiated by those outside the settlement house,
whether the local Community Chest or public sector contractor.
Since 1980 these once privately funded nonprofits receive an
increasingly high percentage of their funding-on average 85%from corporate- style, public sector contracts which heavily influence settlement role and program (Kraus and Chaudry, 1995).
Method
This qualitative history and analysis of settlement financial
structures is heavily dependent on the literature, primary and
secondary, related to the larger social settlements. It focuses on
New York City settlements such as Henry Street and Greenwich
House and United Neighborhood Houses, the collective organization of New York settlements. But it also relies on the extensive
literature related to Hull-House in Chicago, as well as the secondary accounts of social settlements in general. It pieces together
a history of settlement house financing and administration based
on the larger and more notable settlement houses. It tends not
to include the much less accessible financial and administrative
records of smaller and more obscure ones. Chambers (2000) offers
that in the many settlement collections he has surveyed, budget
materials are largely missing.
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Private Financing and Informal
Administration in the Progressive Era
From the outset, financing the settlement house was a private matter. It occurred in an obscured private process built on
relationships established by settlement directors and board members with wealthy city elites. In the early years, financing and
oversight structure were loose, spontaneous, and personal. Early
settlement leaders believed that the very idea of an organized
institution contradicted their goals of neighborly reciprocity and
informality (Leiby, 1978). The combination of informal structures
and informal financing based on personal relationships enabled
settlements to maintain a significant degree of independence. This
independence, in turn, helped operationalize an autonomous,
innovative, and flexible community-oriented practice.
In the early years of the settlements money and the sources of
funding were rarely discussed publicly. Even head workers did
not seem to know the exact financial condition of their house;
financial accounting was quite rudimentary with probably few
or no financial audits or annual budgets prior to 1912 (Lohmann,
1991). As noted earlier, funding is rarely mentioned in the writings
of settlement leaders or historians. Settlements grow and prosper,
buildings and programs multiply, seemingly on their own. The
extensive cultivation of elite patrons is largely off the record.
Based on her relationship with Mrs. Loeb, the wife of one of the
partners of the investment house of Kuhn, Loeb, and Company,
financier Jacob Schiff gave Lillian Wald the buildings at 265 and
267 Henry Street to stabilize her work (Wald, 1934; Hall, 1971). Of
course, as administrators of voluntary associations, they knew
well the importance of money and fund-raising, even if informal
accounting systems kept them unaware of their actual financial
condition.
Despite the reform fervor of the era, fund-raising was never
easy. Two generations of head workers later, Bertram Beck of
Henry Street Settlement thought the support for settlement work,
even social action, was what distinguished the pioneering settlement houses from their counterparts in the 1970s. "The early
settlement leaders were able to win continuous financial support
from the rich despite their advancement of unpopular social
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causes" (Beck, 1976, p. 271). But settlements did not have the
unlimited support of the economic elites of the day. Even at HullHouse, which experienced extraordinary growth prior to World
War I and became not only the leading settlement and a center of
national progressivism but the model for social service delivery,
funding was precarious. As Jane Addams noted in discussing
erecting a new building, "I do not wish to give a false impression,
for we were often bitterly pressed for money and worried by the
prospect of unpaid bills, and we gave up one golden scheme after
another because we could not afford it; we cooked the means and
kept the books and washed the windows without a thought of
hardship if we thereby saved money for the consummation of
some ardently desired undertaking" (Adams, 1910, p.89). For its
first 70 years, Henry Street Settlement depended solely on private
donations. The head worker and board members were actively
involved in fund raising, seeking private contributions, bequests
and foundation support (Lohmann, 1991). Henry Street always
needed funds. Lillian Wald, its renowned first head worker and
Helen Hall's predecessor, was a most talented fundraiser. To raise
money in 1913, Henry Street developed a 2 0 th anniversary endowment campaign. As one friend observed, "It costs five thousand
dollars to sit next to her at dinner" (Wallach, 1978, p348). This first
generation of settlement leaders, especially at the most heralded
settlements, was well connected. Critically, part of this private
process included a tacit agreement that private funding for public
purposes would remain a private matter.
During the Progressive Era funding for settlements did expand quickly and dramatically. The budget of University Settlement in New York City expanded from $2,500 in 1889 to $29,687.47
in 1909. As settlements expanded and their budgets grew to cover
added expenditures for personnel, buildings, and programs, they
were forced to become relatively more formalized, and financing,
at first rather informal and personal, became more well-defined.
A study of New York City settlements concludes "Not only was
the search for money a continuing struggle, but the justification
for funds too often was based on the quantitative measurement
of how many baths were provided, how many books taken from
the settlement library, how many clubs were meeting at any given
time, or how many children were enrolled in the kindergarten.
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How many hours were spent in the accumulation of such data
can never be estimated; how much dedication to settlement work
found a frustrating end is impossible to determine" (Kraus, 1980,
p. 33). The demands of bureaucratic organization, such as increased paper work and accountability for administrators and
staff, while certainly still modest were beginning to be evident
even in the early history of the settlement house.
Increasingly Conservative and
Bureaucratic Administration, 1918-1929
With the so-called Red Scare of 1918, the settlements declined
not only in the popular but also in the philanthropic imagination.
In the troubled postwar years, fund-raising continued to be a
perennial-or more accurately, annual-headache for head workers and their boards (Carson, 1990). Funding heavily shaped not
only the nature of programming but whether a settlement would
exist at all. In response to the Red Scare, more conservative settlements attracted business support. In Gary, Indiana after the First
World War, as labor militancy seemed to threaten corporate hegemony, Crocker (1992) writes, U.S. Steel invested in settlements in
order to build good will in the community and to use expanded
services to pacify discontent. In more progressive settlements,
such as Hull-House and Henry Street, support declined. In 1918
Henry Street was so concerned about the impact of the war on
funding, it became one of the first voluntary organizations to hire
a public relations expert to promote the organization (Carson,
1990).
Financial support also declined due to the politics of settlement leaders such as Jane Addams and Lillian Wald (Sullivan,
1993). Many donors no longer would fund social change, especially if it seemed controversial or "un-American." From the beginning of the First World War through 1935, Romanofsky (1978)
writes, "the financial situation of Hull-House suffered as donors
withdrew their support because of Miss Addams's controversial pacifism and opposition to the war.... Leading contributors

of the early period were dying, and potential other supporters
feared Hull-House's reputed radicalism." (p3 5 3 ). The same was
true at Henry Street. Wald's settlement aims had generally been
supported by her wealthy patrons, but they withdrew financing
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because of Wald's pacifism during and after the war (Wallach,
1978; Wald, 1934). Wald scoffed at them. "Confidentially, my political attitude is making some of our generous friends uneasy and
one of our largest givers-nearly $15,000 a year-has withdrawn
because I am 'socialistically inclined.' Poor things; I am sorry for
them-they are so scared. It is foolish since, after all, counting
things in the large and wide, I am at least one insurance against
unreasonable revolution in New York" (Chambers, 1963, p.25).
Once the Red Scare climate subsided and prosperity for certain sectors of the economy was renewed, aggregate funding
improved for voluntary associations such as settlements. This is a
significant deviation from the cyclical model of social investment
expansion and contraction: initial retrenchment of programming
and funding followed by expanded support for select, noncontroversial nonprofit social service work if economic growth occurs.
Charitable giving is more circumscribed than before, with allocations for services such as educational and recreational activities
but not for social advocacy or activism. Toward the end of the
decade most settlement houses did experience expanded and
stable funding. In the larger society, rapid wealth accumulation
reinvigorated private giving (Huntley, 1935). It was within this
context that in 1928 United Neighborhood Houses (UNH), the
association of New York City settlement houses, urged its member settlements to "ask for large gifts and expect large returns"
(Herrick, 1970, p. 144).
Critically, many settlements in the 1920s became increasingly
dependent on Community Chests. Business involvement in settlements accelerated with the First World War, and became formalized afterwards in the 1920s with the establishment of Community Chests nationwide. Chests reduced the dependence of
some houses on religious institutions by offering a potentially
steady stream of stable, alternate funding. Chest support, however, also required standardized operations. It transformed previously informal organizations into ones that had to be more aware
of effective and accountable administration. The early style of
settlement voluntary work-autonomous, innovative, informal,
passionate, and committed-gradually became more administrative, businesslike, bureaucratic, and constricted (Trolander, 1975;
Walkowitz, 1999).
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There was another price paid for Chest support. Community
Chests were run by conservative business interests and social
work agency executives strongly opposed to social action. Increasingly, for organizations interested in social reform and social
action, the whole decade, as Grace Abbott remarked, was "a
long hard struggle... uphill all the way" (Chambers, 1992, 452).
Trolander (1975) argues this turn away from social reform resulted
primarily from Community Chest concentration of power over
administration and funding.
The Origins of Public Federal Support
of Settlement Work, 1929-1946
The early years of the Depression hit settlement financing
hard. United Neighborhood Houses almost went out of business
in 1931. The overall number of settlements declined significantly.
In the 1930s a National Federation of Settlement (NFS) study reported that approximately 230 settlement houses remained in the
United States, just over half the number of settlements operating
in 1910 (Wenocur and Reisch, 1989). Many settlements experienced budget cuts of up to 70%, which resulted in widespread
reductions in programs and salaries (Simkhovitch, 1938). Henry
Street cut its budget significantly by reducing salaries and discontinuing entire programs in music, arts, and crafts (Herrick,
1970). Year after year as the Depression deepened settlements
learned the limits of local relief, Community Chests, and private
philanthropy.
In response to the drastic need for additional support and
to the emergence of federal social welfare programs under the
New Deal, many settlements in the 1930s relaxed their resistance to public funding. Many settlements increased their workforce tenfold with National Youth Administration (NYA) and
Works Progress Administration (WPA) assistance. Helen Hall
recounts, "One day I was suddenly informed that Henry Street
had been assigned fifty white-collar workers at one fell swoop"
(Hall, 1971, p. 30).
Another administrative development associated with the
structures of Depression era public funding was that money could
only be used for specific programs or needs, not for general
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purposes as determined by settlement staff. For example, even
with the infusion of NYA and WPA support, practically all the
settlements in a New York City study (Kennedy, Farra, et al. 1935)
were seriously handicapped by the inadequate allocations for
clerical help. Federal money went to staff "volunteers," but little if
any resources were expended on infrastructure needs. This aspect
of public sector funding would continue to seriously burden the
settlement house and other nonprofits.
Nevertheless, New York City settlements in this era did not
capitulate to pressures from either funders or the social work
profession to become "modern" welfare agencies, complete with
more bureaucratic procedures and administrators, heavy with
caseworkers, and burdened by "complex guidelines for accepting
and dealing with clients" (Herrick, 1970, p. 154-55). While they
adopted many techniques of professional social work, settlements
retained an open, neighborhood approach which resisted the
types of narrow program and project specialization that would
later define their approach to service delivery. Public sector funding in the 1930s did not completely transform settlement house
programming, neither did it resolve funding problems. Even with
New Deal support, money remained scarce.
Economic hard times and consequent tight funding for settlement work during the Depression prompted the development
in Chicago in 1935 and New York City in 1939 of the "deficit
fund system". In both cities settlements were wary of Community
Chest control, but reluctantly accepted the value of a privately
raised centralized fund other than the Community Chest to help
with settlement expenses. In New York, the independent board
was called the Greater New York Fund. Despite the growing gap
between expenses and revenue, important segments of settlement
leadership remained wary of the tradeoffs that might be associated with accepting dollars from a Chest-style fund. Helen Harris,
a member of the Executive Committee of the UNH, opposed
the deficit system because centralized private boards in other
cities had done little to fund "unmet" needs and had provided
little support for long-term social welfare planning. Helen Hall's
objections were more political. In New York City, she noted, there
was no labor representation on the Community Chest's board.
She and Stanley Issacs, the president of UNH, also feared the
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Greater New York Fund would be dominated by "Wall Street
businessmen [seeking] to impose their will on the community"
(Hall cited in Herrick, 1970, 152). Wherever Chests financed settlements in other cities, Hall said, social action was under attack
by these powerful interests that were essentially hostile to social
reform. UNH voted in 1938 to join the deficit-funding system,
partially because settlement leaders such as Mary Simkhovitch
supported it but fundamentally because of what UNH treasurer
John Bloodgood referred to as a "drying up" of voluntary individual contributions, the traditional basis of settlement financing
(Herrick, 1970, p. 153).
One of the key challenges posed by Federal support was that
such assistance depended on national, not local, needs and initiatives. Lillian Wald, the founder of Henry Street, concluded that
while a central lesson of the Depression was "that government
must take more responsibility for social welfare," she also thought
that private contributions were essential too. "It is impossible to
wait upon government appropriations for all the emergencies that
clamor at the door" (Wald, 1934, p.128). Moreover, Federal support could be withdrawn as quickly as it was allotted. With entry
into World War II all national attention and energy focused on the
conflict. Clearly the war united the citizenry in a struggle against
totalitarianism and oppression abroad. Many of the problems of
the Depression: poverty, unemployment, national purpose, and
community building were resolved or transcended by the war effort. But settlement houses went into a tailspin during World War
II, beginning the transition to a more private era in the postwar
context. While some settlements had increased staff nearly tenfold
during the New Deal, by 1940 the numbers diminished substantially and by 1943 completely evaporated (Bryan and Davis,
1990). The quick and permanent withdrawal of public employees
resulted in severe problems for settlements which had become
highly dependent on such staffing. Most settlements survived
the withdrawal of public-paid workers, but not without great
sacrifice to activities and staff. Additionally, new programming
during World War II-services for pre-school aged children as
well as those for soldiers and displaced people-imposed new
burdens as funding and staffing remained in short supply (Soule,
1947). By 1943, for example, Hull-House seemed closer to demise
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than ever before (Davis and McCree, 1969). Declining funds and
the new pressures of the war were powerful cross-currents that
reduced settlements to their "nadir" during and just after World
War II (Trattner, 1999, p. 307).
Expanded Public Financing of
Settlements in a Private Era, 1947-1960
Throughout the postwar years and until the 1960s, lack of
funds constrained settlement programming. The trend of defunding and scratching out an existence during and directly after
World War II continued through the mid-1950s. Once again, settlement funding in a private era followed the pattern of initial
social disinvestment, especially the defunding of social action and
social reform programs. (For analyses of the decade which differ
with the above see Carter, 1983; Fisher, 1999.) But, then, with the
return of economic growth, there developed increased funding
for recreational, educational, and social services. Even more important, however, the 1950s serve as a critical watershed for the
transformation of settlements into publicly financed bureaucratic
social service agencies.
The lessons learned about the power and effectiveness of
Federal intervention during the New Deal and World War II
created a basis for continued funding of specific social services. In
1953-54 the federal government allocated $124.1 million to such
social welfare services as school lunches, vocational rehabilitation, institutional services, and child welfare. Moreover, state and
local governments disbursed $605 million, most of it for public
institutions such as schools for the developmentally disabled,
hospitals for the mentally ill, and training programs for juvenile
delinquents (Smith and Lipsky, 1993). But rarely was any of the
money channeled to nonprofits. Public funding for nonprofits in
the 1950s was rare, except in a few claimant areas, most of which
did not include settlements. One of them, however, did directly
affect them: juvenile delinquency.
Juvenile delinquency was to the 1950s what poverty and race
would later become to the 1960s, the defining social issue of the
decade. In keeping with the conservative context of the decade,
delinquency prevention emphasized traditional family values
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and law and order. Of particular importance, public contracts
for juvenile delinquency prevention began the modern trend of
using federal government grants to private institutions to address
specific public problems (Trattner, 1999). Settlements had been
engaged in working with youth for decades. They were well
positioned to renew their efforts when delinquency became "hot"
as a social issue and funding available for prevention work. In the
latter part of the 1950s, a grant proposal regarding juvenile delinquency had an excellent chance of being funded. For example,
the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act was a
source of substantial grants for experimental programs during the
late 1950s (Trolander, 1987). These grants, however, only foreshadowed a larger and more complex system of public contracting
of nonprofit services which would begin with Mobilization for
Youth and the Great Society programs of the 1960s.
The "Great Society" Institutionalizes Contracting, 1960-1975
Specific changes associated with the Sixties quickly transformed the settlement house. Regarding practice and program the
era reinfused settlements with a social reform and social action
component-tarnished but resharpened spearheads for reform.
In terms of administration and financing, government funding
profoundly altered settlements structurally, a change which has
persisted to the present. Private funding to private institutions
for public purposes had been the "settlement way" since their
inception. With the 1960s and the institution of broad scale federal
funding to nonprofits in the form of individual disbursements for
such programs as Medicare and Medicaid and aggregate funding
for contracted projects like Head Start, the system became one
of public funding to private institutions for public purposes.
Funding for settlements was now not only qualitatively but also
quantitatively different.
Qualitatively, the War on Poverty of the mid-1960s renewed
settlements. It gave extensive Federal financial support to organizations working with the poor, addressing the "social" causes of
poverty, and pursuing a decentralized strategy of change at the
neighborhood level (Marris and Rein, 1967). Of course, the settlements were not passive recipients in this process. Henry Street,
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for example, was an initiator of Mobilization for Youth (MFY),
arguably the model experiment in community-based responses
to poverty and powerlessness upon which much of the Great
Society programming was based (Hall, 1971, Beck, 1976, 1977).
Quantitatively, MFY represents an early benchmark in the
heightened relationship between federal grants and nonprofit
social service agencies. By 1968, the federal government had
invested over $30 million in services to residents of the lower
East Side of New York City where Henry Street was located (Hall,
1971). From the mid-60s onward, the Great Society, limits aside,
wrought profound changes and brought massive funding for
neighborhood work and social change (Halpern, 1995). Federal
expenditures for social welfare services tripled in only five years,
increasing from $812 million in 1965 to $2.2 billion in 1970. In
contrast, local and state expenditure expanded 50% in the same
time period. Most important for settlements, a large percentage of
the public funding for social welfare services was now being spent
through nonprofit agencies. The Office of Economic Opportunity,
developed in 1964 to administer the War on Poverty, dramatically expanded the amount of money available for communitybased nonprofit programs, including settlements (Kravitz, 1969).
Additionally, as popular pressure mounted for increased public
support of social service programming, Congress amended the
Social Security Act in 1967 so that states could develop purchase
of service contracts (POSC) with private agencies. This program
guaranteed states federal support up to three times (300%) the
amount they could raise from private or other public sources.
Funding under this Title-IV-A amendment jumped from $281
million in 1967 to $1.6 billion five years later. (Smith and Lipsky, 1993; Levitan, 1969). These new financing arrangements created expansive opportunity to both promote social change and
develop community-based programs. It was as though Lyndon
Johnson and the United States Congress were trying to do for
the settlements and poor urban neighborhoods what Jane Addams, Lillian Wald, Helen Hall, and countless others had only
dreamed of a half-century earlier. Not only were they making
neighborhood-based poverty work a concern of American social
policy, they were funding it (Halpern, 1995).
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The experience of Hull-House during these years, while certainly not representative of all settlements, concretely illustrates
the impact of public financing on settlement staffing and budget.
From 1962 to 1969, the Hull-House staff expanded from about
forty people to over three hundred. In 1969 its budget doubled,
increasing from under $1 million to $2 million (Romanofsky,
1978). Its contracted services included such War on Poverty programs as VISTA, Meals-on-Wheels, Head Start, and Neighborhood Youth Corp.
Increased federal support, channeled primarily through individual reimbursements via Medicare and Medicaid and aggregate contracts for specific programs changed the composition
as well as role of the settlement house. In the past, when settlements were dependent on private donations, board members
were drawn from the city elite. Securing support was an expected
responsibility of board appointees. With the Great Society programs, however, there was an increased emphasis on the poor
representing themselves. Such tendency was maximized as a
matter of policy through "maximum feasible participation of the
poor" (Moynihan, 1969). Pressures for participation and equal
voice mounted throughout the public and nonprofit world. A
1936 study of settlements in New York reported that 25 of 34
settlements had no one from the neighborhood on their boards.
By 1968, the NFS estimated, 25% of settlements boards were comprised of neighborhood residents or their representatives. By 1970
the figure was 75%. Increasingly the board changed from being all
white to predominantly people of color. By 1975, more than half
the directors of settlement houses were nonwhite (Beck, 1977).
Clearly, settlements were responding to pressures from the social
movements of the 1960s for inclusion and democratic process. But
public contracting also promoted diversification and democratization of settlement boards. They were no longer dependent on
private funding. They were no longer dependent on the boards
to raise money.
Public funding, however, was fraught with challenges and
dilemmas for settlements, ones that were apparent early on. Settlement leaders such as Helen Hall, who retired from Henry Street
in 1967, articulated clearly both virtues and drawbacks in federal
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funding (Andrews, 1990). First, securing funding from the public
sector was very difficult work, especially for smaller agencies.
"Just filling out the forms and questionnaires required to get public money is an exercise in perspicacity and endurance, aside from
the real job of interesting the beleaguered public servant in even
your most creative plans" (Hall, 1971, p, 87). Second, contracts
were always a compromise between what the settlement wanted
to do, or what the settlement really needed money for, and what
the government was willing to fund. "Sometimes the combination
is a reinforcement and improvement on the original [settlement]
plan, and sometimes a distortion" (Hall, 1971, p.87). Third, and
related, government funding often steered settlements toward
trading off their own and/or community needs in favor of federal
priorities. Instead of identifying a community need and finding
funds to develop a program to address it, there was an increasing tendency to launch programs simply because government
money was available. Hall preferred funding for "basic on-going
budgets," rather than the restrictive funding for specific projects.
"I have often wished that more foundations would decide to give
not only to new projects but to put aside a good percentage of
their funds for the support of the basic on-going budgets of the
kind of agencies in which they are interested, using the rest for
the experiments of limited duration" (Hall, 1971, p.88). Running
programs demanded increased bureaucratization and formalization, as well as ever greater attentiveness to the whims of policy
makers in Washington or Albany. Moreover, government funding
fluctuated. Program support, here today, could be gone tomorrow
depending upon the action of Congress, the President, or a state
legislature. Critically, contracting also seemed to overextend programs, creating a need for additional monies not provided in the
contracts. (See also Kettner and Martin, 1996; Smith and Lipsky,
1993) Despite its big budget in 1967, Hull-House had a $200,000
deficit, "and it was larger in each of the next two years" (Bryan
and Davis, 1990, p. 279). While settlements benefitted from Great
Society programs in particular and public funding in general,
Trolander (1987) concluded that "the net effect of the War On
Poverty may well have been to contribute to the demise of the
traditional settlement house movement" (p.18 7).
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Concurrent with the institutionalization of the new contracting relationship between nonprofits and the public sector, support for social action waned. By 1967 conservatives in Congress
were undercutting and defunding the social action component
of the War on Poverty (Piven and Cloward, 1971) Deeper reductions during President Nixon's administration, 1969-1973,
created greater financial strain for settlements. While social action programming continued to be defunded, the Nixon era cuts
turned out to be only a temporary if difficult downturn for contracted funding to nonprofit service providers. For example, Federal spending on OEO and ACTION programs increased from
$51.7 million in 1965 to $2.3 billion in 1980. Likewise spending at
the Federal level for community mental health centers expanded
from $143 million in 1969 to $1.4 billion in 1979. With the passage
of Titles IV and XX of the 1974 revision to the Social Security Act,
which allows the federal government to purchase service from
private agencies, public funding for community-based nonprofit
work increased yet again.
The sweeping change in the 1960s of the fiscal underpinnings
of settlement programming is illustrated by the Henry Street
experience. For its first seventy years Henry Street was heavily
dependent on private funding. That changed dramatically in
the 1960s. By 1975 federal government funding accounted for
approximately two-thirds of its $4.5 million annual budget. It
had a staff of five hundred, most of whom were involved in
government contract projects (Wallach, 1978). What developed
and was permanently established in the 1960s was a new funding relationship with Federal, state, and local governments that
transformed the settlement house into a different organization
after 1975. Contracting in an era of privatization and economic
globalization had begun.
Privatization and Contracting Since 1975
A study undertaken by the United Neighborhood Houses of
New York (UNH) for the Ford Foundation in 1991 calculated
that 80% of the funding for the 38 member settlements in New
York City came from public contracts. Kraus and Chaudry (1995)
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estimate 85%.As noted, the settlement houses benefitted from
the public dollars. With public support they were able to help
address the needs of poor children, their families, and their innercity communities by providing a broad array of neighborhoodbased social activities and human services. But they were burdened by the public contracts as well. They were overwhelmed,
the executive director of United Neighborhood Houses stated,
by "the administrative time and cost now spent in issuing and
responding to multiple requests for proposals and in preparing
and processing thousands of forms for auditing, monitoring, and
reporting on programs" (Marks, 1993, p. 24). Equally significant,
public funds were becoming more and more restrictive, allowing use for only "single-problem categories" such as illiteracy,
substance abuse, or child care. Funding was "too inflexible to
permit appropriate responses" to worsening and ever changing
needs of the community (Marks, 1993, p. 24-25). According to
Rolland Smith (1995), executive director of the Greater Cleveland
Neighborhood Centers Association, the combination of neoconservative social agendas, a more constrictive and volatile system
of contracting, and declining private money despite increasing
upper class wealth forced settlement houses "to use up fund
balances, defer maintenance on buildings, pay salaries well below parity, scramble for funding, and often operate with a crisis
mentality" (p2132).
While some may consider the settlement house an artifact, the
current 37 houses in New York City deliver an impressive and
wide-ranging array of services to nearly 200,000 people annually
(Kraus and Chaudry, 1995). These services, as with the nonprofit
sector in general, are heavily influenced by government funding.
The settlement house once had the distinction of being an innovative, autonomous, flexible agency embedded in community life.
But the bureaucratization and formalization that accompanies
contemporary contracting hastens other forms of organizational
development. As Kraus and Chaudry note, "In too many instances, settlements have grown to resemble their funders-with
specialized staff, organized by categorical programs, who often
answer more to the rules and regulations of their funding agencies
than to changing neighborhood conditions." (p. 34). Critically, the
continued persistence of the settlement house in the 1990s, even
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its potential revival, occurred as both part of a transformation
of its programs and structures and the recreation of the welfare
state. In the new privatized welfare state, settlement houses, like
most nonprofits, persist at the same time they are besieged by dual
pressures from an intensified contracting system and from heightened and unmet chronic needs of their communities (Smith,1995;
Sclar, 2000).
In this regard, Emily Marks, Executive Director of United
Neighborhood Houses, comments that "In order to secure government and foundation support over the last 40 years, however,
settlements have had to adjust to an increasingly fragmented
and categorical funding environment. Aimed at ameliorating
deficits, the structure of both public and private funding has limited opportunities to develop community-building approaches."
(Marks, 1998, i) In the past, settlements sought from the outset to
build a sense of neighborhood identity and cohesiveness. Their
view of society as an organic whole required the elements-in
and outside of the neighborhood-to work together (Melvin,
1987). They strove for "community embededness" (Hirota and
Ferroussier-Davis, 1998). At present, geographic community and
even cultural community are assigned less importance within a
fiscal environment that emphasizes varied categorical programs
and the wide range of multiple service contracts. In this way,
contracting undermines the ability of nonprofits such as settlements to build local solidarity and enhance community, as well
as engage in social action or social reform initiatives (Hirota and
Ferroussier-Davis,1998).
By the mid-1990s the heightened atmosphere of privatization
initiated by the "Contract with America" sought tax and social
service cuts and the general dismantling of social welfare programming. Under the older contracting system, nonprofits and
settlement houses traded off professional autonomy and organizational independence for a degree of financial stability in an ever
more fiscally unstable political-economic context (Dailey, 1974).
Under the new "Contract," implemented in New York by Governor George Pataki and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani but initiated
earlier by the administration of Mayor Koch, pressure intensified
on the nonprofit social service sector (Smith, 1998; Sites, 1997).
Increasingly they were forced to sacrifice not only professional
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autonomy, but, with the fiscal cutbacks and intensified economic
pressures, expected to endure less financial stability and greater
bureaucratic demand for accountability.
Conclusion
Clearly much more work needs to be done regarding the financial history of nonprofit social service agencies in general and
settlements in particular. This initial overview establishes historic
trends which underscore critical elements. First, it emphasizes
that there is a direct relationship between the larger political
economy and the funding, or defunding, of community organizing and social reform efforts. Second, the relationship between
funding, political economy, and social service programming is
more complex than an expansion/contraction dualistic model
reveals. Settlement houses both influenced funding and the larger
political economy just as they were affected by them. Moreover,
funding may expand in periods characterized generally by social
disinvestment, but such funds are directed to more conservative
programming. Third, financing plays a major role in influencing
the nature of settlement programming, especially the balance
between service delivery and social action. Fourth, over the past
century the voluntary agency has become increasingly dependent
upon contracted public funds. Fifth, contracted public funding to
nonprofits is not a static system. During our most recent conservative era public funds are being dramatically restructured to
configure the nature of social services and voluntary agencies in
ways that are ever more like the private sector. The changes are
profound, heavily influencing not only the very nature of settlement programming but their potential to engage in the traditional
settlement projects of community building and social reform. In
this regard, Putnam (2000) underscores the importance of latent
community building organizations like the settlement house as a
political counter pull to the contemporary decline of civil life and
social cohesiveness. But like many others he under-appreciates
the impact of new financing and administrative arrangements
on the structural base and organizational culture of community
service institutions such as settlements. This study reveals how
throughout its history the settlement house has been transformed
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by critical changes in its funding base and the larger political
economy. Our contemporary era is certainly no exception.
Note
1. American social welfare and political history in the past century has
been described as a series of cycles between eras which are more public
regarding and more private regarding (Schlesinger, Jr. 1986). Piven and
Cloward (1971; 1999) discuss the shifts in terms of periods of consensus
and dissensus politics. Most recently, Putnam (2000) sees it in terms of
up and downs in "civic engagement." (p.25) Historians, social scientists,
social workers and others agree in general on the periodization of this
model. See, for example, Reisch (1998) and Ehrenreich (1985). Periods
of public investment and social activism include the Progressive Era
(1900-1918), The New Deal and World War II Era (1933-1946), and The
Sixties (1963-1973). Private contexts are The Gilded Age (1877-1896),
The Twenties (1920-1929), The Fifties (1948-1959), and our contemporary
world (1975-present). The years in between are times of transition. The
model provides a single lens to put in context the more than 100 year
history of the social settlements. Clearly all models have limits. They
reduce historical complexity and conflate historical specificity. They risk
becoming mechanical and running counter to lived experience. Regarding
the social investment model, we recognize that historical change usually
comes slowly and incrementally, rather than in sudden shifts. The dates
offered are obviously not absolute, but designed to emphasize a general
change in national political atmosphere and a shift in the context for social
investment. Equally important, continuities in American history such as
a broad consensus on private property and individualism, the persistence
of class and racial domination, and the hegemony of capitalist development are certainly as significant as the changes this model emphasizes
(Hofstadter, 1948; Dowd, 1974; Crocker, 1992; Walkowitz, 1999). These
and other caveats acknowledged, subsequent stages of this discussion
provide a fuller and more graphic depiction of the shifts in support for
social investment and their influence on settlement programming.
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